













The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the 















 The valuation of biodiversity conservation by the
South African Khomani San “bushmen”
community
Johane Dikgang and Edwin Muchapondwa∗
November 15, 2011
Abstract
The restitution of land to the Khomani San “bushmen” and Mier “agricultural” commu-
nities in May 2002 marked a signiﬁcant shift in conservation in the Kgalagadi area in South
Africa. The Khomani San and Mier communities were awarded land inside and outside the
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. Given that the Khomani San interact more with nature, biodi-
versity conservation will only beneﬁt from the land restitution in this case if the Khomani San
are good environmental stewards. Therefore, this paper uses the contingent valuation method
to investigate the values assigned to biodiversity conserved under the various forms of land
tenure arrangements by the Khomani San in the Kgalagadi area and compares them to similar
valuations by the adjacent Mier community. The proposed conservation programme sought to
plant as many native trees, shrubs and grasslands as required to reduce biodiversity loss by
10% in terms of the quantities of each of the selected major species of the area. Despite the
fact that the conservation programme has both winners and losers when implemented under
any of the three land tenure arrangements considered, the ﬁndings suggest that the Khomani
San, whose attitudes towards modern conservation have not been evaluated until now, and the
adjacent Mier community generally attach a signiﬁcant economic value to biodiversity in their
area. The net economic value for conserving biodiversity under the various forms of land tenure
arrangements by the Khomani San ranged from R928 to R4 672 relative to the Mier commu-
nity’s range of R25 600 to R64 000. However, for both communities, in order for all members
of the local communities to support biodiversity conservation unconditionally, mechanisms for
fair distribution of the associated costs and beneﬁts should be put in place.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many settings, there is an ecological inter-linkage between the areas inside and outside protected
areas. Hansen and DeFries (2007) observed that biodiversity1 conservation targets are not being
met inside protected areas, which are in the front line of conservation, partly because of increasing
adverse inﬂuence from activities carried out outside protected areas. Consequently, biodiversity
conservation ought to take place outside protected areas as well.
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1According to the Convention on Biological Diversity, “biological diversity” means the variability amongst living
organisms from all sources, including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (CBD
1992).
1Accordingly, the actions of local communities crucially inﬂuence the success or failure of biodi-
versity conservation for two reasons. First, local communities are usually in charge of some areas
outside protected areas, which they use to provide for their own livelihoods. In some cases, the exis-
tence of perverse incentives distracts them from prioritising activities which complement biodiversity
conservation. Second, the same perverse incentives also fuel unfriendly conservation practices by lo-
cal communities whenever they get access to protected areas as a result of either land restitution or
pure encroachment.
Unfriendly conservation practices reduce existing conservation opportunities. Such a leakage of
conservation opportunities would need to be plugged before serious eﬀort to get new conservation
opportunities outside protected areas is applied. While unfriendly conservation practices coming
alongside encroachment are usually easy to prevent by alienating local communities where they do
not have user rights in the protected areas such practices might not be so easy to prevent in cases
where local communities are co-owners of protected areas as a result of land restitution.
Furthermore, failure to conserve biodiversity outside protected areas will lead to more pressure
being put on the park especially where the local communities have resource rights inside as well.
Harvesting of natural resources inside the park potentially could have two impacts. Firstly, it could
most likely compromise the integrity of biodiversity as compared to regimes of no use, and secondly,
it could have a devastating impact in terms of the ability of the protected area to attract tourists
and generate revenues to plough back into conservation.
In South Africa, land degradation is perceived to be positively correlated with distribution of
communal rangelands (Department of Environmental Aﬀairs and Tourism 2010). Wind and water
erosion are identiﬁed as the main drivers of soil degradation, while changes in species composition,
loss of plant cover, and bush encroachment are considered to be the most frequent forms of vegetation
degradation. Many communal lands are severely degraded in four provinces including the Northern
Cape. For example, the main challenge in the Kgalagadi area in the Northern Cape is that the
current levels of harvesting of medicinal plants, wood collection, grazing and hunting are highly
likely to result in the depletion of the resources. Such a situation is bad for the area’s conservation
in general because of the inter-linkages between the broader Kgalagadi area and the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park.
The Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, located between Botswana and South Africa, encompasses
part of the ancestral site of the Khomani San “bushmen”2. As part of South Africa’s land restitu-
tion programme, the Khomani San community was awarded land inside and outside the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier Park in May 2002, together with the adjacent Mier community.3 The South African
National Parks (SANParks) was tasked with co-managing the acquired land inside the park as con-
tractual parks on behalf of the local communities. However, given the intimate connection between
the land inside and outside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park entailed by the land restitution deal,
conservation of biodiversity needs to be undertaken in the broader Kgalagadi landscape and not just
inside the park.
It is clear from the way land restitution claims within protected areas have been handled so far
in South Africa that sustainability and biodiversity conservation are critically important, and that
the government is of the view that land claims by individuals and groups must be achieved in the
national interest by “taking into consideration the intrinsic biodiversity value of the land and seeking
outcomes which will combine the objectives of restitution with the conservation and sustainable use
of biodiversity” (De Villiers 1999; Wynberg and Kepe 1999; Hall-Martin and Carruthers 2003).
Thus, the challenge facing the Kgalagadi area is how the landscape can be managed as a whole
in a manner that enhances conservation and complementary land-use practices (e.g. medicinal plant
2The term “bushmen” is generically used to refer to the Khoisan. Culturally, the Khoisan are divided into the
hunter-gatherer San and the pastoral Khoi (Barnard 1992).
3In addition, the Khomani San people were awarded additional and special rights in the remainder of the park
because they lost more land in comparison to the Mier community during the establishment of the Park. The special
rights include commercial development and undertaking of cultural activities (Bosch and Hirschfeld 2002).
2harvesting), and discourage conﬂicting practices (e.g. excessive stock farming). The implication of
such an approach is that conservation also needs to spread to the communal and municipal lands
adjacent to Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park.4 To ensure success of such an approach there is a need
to identify and deal with any factors that militate against sound conservation in the whole area.
Biodiversity has long been regarded as a public good, and for that reason national parks have
been dependent mainly on government funding for conservation ﬁnance. This implies that, if biodi-
versity conservation cannot pay for itself, local communities also need compensation for undertaking
biodiversity conservation. Thus, in order for local communities to be stewards of biodiversity, they
need to draw associated beneﬁts from somewhere — either from conservation itself or some external
body. Thus, a question can be raised from the above scenario: is restitution of land under conser-
vation to an indigenous group detrimental for modern conservation? Given that they interact more
with nature by harvesting medicinal plants, bush-food and hunting for their livelihoods, biodiversity
conservation will only beneﬁt from the land restitution in this case if the Khomani San are good
environmental stewards. If conservation does not pay the bill according to the Khomani San (who
are now co-owners of the biodiversity in the area) then mechanisms which may include additional
economic incentives to them will be needed to ensure that their actions are not detrimental to
conservation.
This paper investigates the value that the Khomani San assign to modern conservation under
various land tenure forms/mechanisms/models/structures and whether they may generally be ex-
pected to be good environmental stewards. This is done by determining the economic value assigned
to biodiversity conservation on communal land, municipal land and park land by the Khomani San,
in a contingent valuation study of a plant conservation programme in the Kgalagadi. In addition,
the paper compares the valuation of biodiversity by this typical pristine indigenous5 community to
that of an average South African rural community, the adjacent Mier community.
This paper is important because the South African San’s attitudes towards modern conserva-
tion have not been evaluated until now. Based on the economics of hunter-gatherer literature, we
hypothesise that:
“The value assigned to biodiversity conservation by the Khomani San people in South Africa
diﬀers from similar valuation by the Mier community”.
No studies exist comparing the values of environmental resources between indigenous people and
the general population. This paper will test whether such a hypothesis is supported by evidence
from the Kgalagadi area in South Africa.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 discusses the economic rationale for valuing
biodiversity and Section 3 presents the study area and the survey. Section 4 discusses descriptive
statistics and results from the study. Section 5 concludes.
2 Economic Valuation of Biodiversity
Ecosystems provide provisioning services, regulation services, support services and cultural services
(MEA 2005). These services directly enter into economic processes, for example, as raw materials,
food and aesthetic services. Thus, the magnitude of the ﬂow of ecosystem services aﬀects human
well-being. The signiﬁcance of biodiversity to the generation of ecosystem services is now widely
4Communal and municipal land importance is not limited to its indigenous biodiversity; this is where the local
community lives, works, recreates, harvests resources, undertakes game and livestock farming (Norton 2002). It is for
this reason that it is argued that communal and municipal lands can make a signiﬁcant contribution to conservation
of biodiversity (Kaval, Yao and Parminter 2007).
5In South Africa, the term “indigenous people” refers to all African ethnic groups. In this paper, the term
“indigenous people” is used to refer to what is referred to as vulnerable indigenous communities in South Africa.
The Khomani San were not historically involved in the formal economy. Today, they cannot entirely ignore the cash
economy although there are still some who are more traditional hunters and gatherers. The exposure of the Khomani
San to the cash economy and external factors, particularly the inﬂu e n c eo fw e s t e r nv a l u es y s t e m s ,i sl i k e l yt oh a v e
resulted in changes to their value systems, resource use, and cultural preferences.
3recognised (WCMC 1992). As such, it is economically rational to conserve biodiversity because of
its contribution to human well-being (Clough 2000).
Successful biodiversity conservation outside protected areas usually requires the integration of
the land with other land uses rather than its separation (Hartley 1997; Kneebone 2000; Kneebone et
al. 2000; Norton 2000). There is a need both to accommodate the most economically beneﬁcial use of
the land and minimise the negative impact on biodiversity (Kneebone 2000). However, landowners
often lack information and evidence about the correct value to use for biodiversity when making
land-use decisions. This usually emanates from two circumstances. Firstly, unlike outputs of most
other land uses, biodiversity is not usually traded in markets, hence landowners fail to appreciate
its correct value when comparing it to other activities. Secondly, even where the correct value of
biodiversity is known, such values are not wholly appropriable by individual landowners because
biodiversity exhibits public good characteristics. All this happens against a background in which
landowners individually bear the full costs of their conservation eﬀorts (CBD 2010). Therefore,
in order for biodiversity conservation to be successful outside protected areas, landowners should
receive the correct value of biodiversity and subsequently use it in land-use decisions.
The determination of the correct value of biodiversity or other environmental resources is called
environmental valuation. Environmental valuation attempts to assign a monetary value to the envi-
ronmental object of interest. The rationale behind environmental valuation is to understand people’s
preferences about the environmental object of interest. Most environmental valuation techniques
entail the elicitation of willingness to pay (WTP). This is commonly done using the contingent valua-
tion method (CVM), in which respondents are asked about their WTP for changes in environmental
good provision in hypothetical scenarios. The use of dichotomous choice (binary or closed-ended)
questions has gained popularity over open-ended questions following the NOAA panel recommenda-
tions (Arrow et al. 1993). The dichotomous choice format involves asking respondents whether or
not they are willing to pay an oﬀered amount for a speciﬁc environmental change. However, there
are circumstances where some variant of the open-ended question format might perform better, for
example when the sample size is limited. According to Mitchell and Carson (1989), the payment card
method gives respondents some assistance in searching for their valuation. It avoids the starting-bid
bias of the closed-ended format and maintains the positive features of an open-ended format. A
recent study by Hanley et al. (2008) also used the payment card to elicit the WTP for landscape
change in a national park.
Most CVM studies deal with environmental public goods. As a result, they restrict WTP to
being non-negative. However, some environmental amenities manifest themselves as costs to some
and beneﬁts to others. In such cases an appropriate consumer surplus measure which accounts for
the loss of utility resulting from an increase in the environmental good provision must be chosen
(Clinch and Murphy 2001).6 Ordinarily, those who lose from an increase in the environmental
good provision would want to be compensated and expect to be asked about their willingness to
accept (WTA) compensation. However, the NOAA panel strongly recommends against the use of
WTA scenarios in CVM studies (Arrow et al. 1993). Thus, the elicitation format should allow
respondents who experience a welfare loss because of the proposed environmental change to state
a negative WTP in a manner we will show later (Hanley et al. 2008; Muchapondwa, Carlsson and
Köhlin 2008). Otherwise, the exclusion of negative WTP may result in an erroneous conclusion with
regard to the net social beneﬁts of the proposed change when the total values are estimated (Hanley
et al. 2008).
Allowing respondents to state a positive WTP to prevent the proposed changes from going ahead,
is one way to include the negative WTP (Clinch and Murphy 2001). An assumption made is that
WTP to prevent the proposed changes can be considered as a proxy of the negative WTP (cost
in the welfare terms) for the proposed changes. Thus, WTP to prevent the proposed change is
6The most commonly used approach to account for welfare losses in a contingent valuation study has been to
make assumptions concerning the negative tail of the WTP distribution, after eliciting the WTP for a change in the
provision of a public good/bad.
4assumed symmetric to the WTA to tolerate the pr o p o s e dc h a n g e( i nt h es e n s eo ft h em i n i m u m
compensation payment needed to restore people to their utility levels prior to the introduction of
the project). Of course, this can only hold as a workable approximation for marginal changes, when
the environmental good of interest is easily substitutable and income eﬀects are marginal (Clinch
and Murphy 2001; Hanley et al. 2008).
Conservation of biodiversity particularly on communal and municipal lands in a developing coun-
try such as South Africa is likely to be viewed as good by some people and bad by others; i.e. it
produces both winners and losers. Determination of the value of biodiversity from the perspectives
of the various stakeholders expected to partake in it will assist to establish the best policy response
where biodiversity is under threat (OECD 1999). Given appropriate and adequate economic incen-
tives, landowners can become eﬀective stewards of land as well as the biodiversity linked with it
(Kneebone et al. 2000).
3 The Study Area and Survey
3.1 The Study Area
The Kgalagadi area in question lies in the Siyanda District Municipality of the Northern Cape
province of South Africa, bordering Botswana and Namibia. The district is approximately 120,000
square kilometres with large areas in the Kgalagadi dessert. The Siyanda District Municipality is
made up of six local municipalities, of which the Mier Local Municipality is one. The population
density of the Mier Local Municipality is low, with an estimated 8,000 Mier indigenous community
households and 320 Khomani San households.
The Mier Local Municipality region is semi-arid and has infrequent rainfall, mostly during sum-
mer. Rain mainly falls on the reddish-brown Kgalagadi sands. It is a very hot area; the temperatures
can reach up to 45 degrees in summer. It is generally warm in winter but temperatures can drop
to below zero at night (Seymour 2001). There is lack of freshwater in the region. Boreholes are
the primary source of water and the water quality is very poor as it is salty. The region is used
predominantly for sheep and game farming, although an increasing number of cattle and goats are
being introduced, despite the area not being best suited to such livestock.
While the Kgalagadi dessert, including the area inside South Africa, has a physically harsh
environment, the Mier Local Municipality region has a rich biodiversity. Biodiversity is considered
an asset for a wide variety of reasons, including its support for the vital and growing nature-based
tourism sector, contributions to the diet of rural people and traditional medicines (Cooper et al.
2004). The Mier Local Municipality is located next to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. The total
area of the park is 387,991 square kilometres, of which approximately 75 percent is on the Botswana
side (Swatuk 2006).
On the South African side, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park has ﬁve segments: (i) belonging
to SANParks and with no local community access, (ii) belonging to SANParks but with Khomani
San access for symbolic cultural use, (iii) belonging to SANParks but with Khomani San access for
commercial joint venture use, (iv) belonging to the Khomani San but managed as a contractual
park with SANParks, and (v) belonging to the Mier community but managed as a contractual park
with SANParks.7 The Mier community and Khomani San agreed to use their land inside the park
for conservation, eco-tourism and cultural activities through 99-year contract parks. The agreement
can only be terminated after the year 2032, with the cancelling party expected to give at least
3 years’ unambiguous notice. A Joint Management Board (JMB) comprising SANParks and the
two communities’ representatives manage the South African side park aﬀairs. SANParks has the
obligation to maintain infrastructure related to conservation and the integrity of nature inside the
7Both contract parks are adjacent to the southern boundary of the park. The Khomani San contract park is close
to the Twee Rivieren park entrance, while the Mier contract park is adjacent to the Mier community’s game farms.
5Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park on the South African side (Bosch and Hirschfeld 2002).
The two local communities jointly own !Xaus lodge inside the park, which was constructed for
them by the government. The lodge is on the border of the Khomani San and Mier contract parks.
Since 2007, a private ﬁrm called Transfrontier Parks Destination has a concession to run the lodge.
The proﬁts generated from the lodge concession are shared equally amongst SANParks, the Mier
Local Municipality (representing the Mier local community) and the Khomani San Community
Property Association8. The Khomani San and Mier communities are also set to get 10% equity in
Transfrontier Parks Destination, through a Trust, after ten years of operation.
The Mier local community lives in the following villages: Askam, Groot Mier, Klein Mier, Loubos,
Noenieput, Philandersbron, Rietfontein and Welkom. The Khomani San people live on the following
farms: Andriesvale, Erin, Farm 24 and 26 — adjacent to the Park, Miershoop Pan, Scotty’s Fort,
Uitkoms and Witdraai.9 There is a need for more conservation to take place in the highly fragile
Kgalagadi ecosystem. The Mier Local Municipality has agreed in principle to expand the size of their
land under conservation. This involves the Mier Local Municipality managing two of their municipal
game farms (Tween Dabas and Loretto) adjacent to the park as a broad-based conservation area
before 2012. Thus, some of the municipal land will be set aside so it could be used for other
conservation purposes besides game farming. The Khomani San has also agreed to use two of its
farms (Farm 24 and 26), which are adjacent to the park, for conservation purposes in addition to
their cultural activities. Thus, these farms will act as a buﬀer zone protecting the Mier contract
park, Khomani San Contract Park and the rest of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (Bosch and
Hirschfeld 2002).
3.2 The Survey
Given that they interact more with nature and that their attitudes are likely to be more important
in determining the success of biodiversity conservation in the area, this paper seeks to determine
the value that the Khomani San community places on biodiversity conservation in the Kgalagadi
area and compare it with that of the adjacent Mier community. To accomplish this, a contingent
valuation survey was conducted in the Mier Local Municipality. The data were gathered through
face-to-face interviews from August to October 2009 and March to April 2011 respectively.
The questionnaire (see the Appendix for survey questionnaire) sought to get data on household
socio-economic characteristics, activities undertaken in the area, relative importance attached to
diﬀerent activities, attitudes towards conservation, rate of participation in conservation and the
valuation of biodiversity. The Khomani San and Mier communities living in the Mier Local Munici-
pality were identiﬁed as the target population. One hundred randomly selected households, divided
equally between the Khomani San and the Mier communities, were interviewed.
The respondents initially were given background information on biodiversity, the general state of
nature in their area, the possible costs and beneﬁts associated with biodiversity conservation, and
a proposal for a biodiversity conservation programme. The biodiversity conservation programme
proposal was as follows: “The government proposes to introduce a conservation programme where
as many native trees, shrubs and grasslands as necessary would be planted and protected with the aim
of achieving a reduction in biodiversity loss of 10% in terms of the quantities of each of the species.
The conservation programme would entail increasing the total amount of land under conservation in
the Kgalagadi area. The conservation programme would also entail a mix of reducing the harvesting
8In 2008, the Khomani San Communal Property Association management committee, which had been in place
since the Khomani San acquired the land, was removed after it was found to have mismanaged ﬁnances and the
Provincial Department of Land Aﬀairs currently administers the Khomani San’s ﬁnances. However, the Department
is working closely with newly elected community representatives.
9The Khomani San farms were intended to be used as follows; Andriesvale for housing, Erin for hunting, Farm
24 and 26 for conservation, Miershoop Pan for game farming, Scotty’s Fort and Uitkoms for livestock, and Witdraai
for cultural purposes. The current situation is that multiple activities including activities other than those initially
intended are taking place on the farms.
6rate of overall species and the prohibition of destructive harvesting by building on more eﬀective
traditional approaches. The proposed programme can be undertaken on either communal land,
municipal land or park land10 with equal biodiversity results. Lack of funding is the main constraint
to implementing the proposed initiative, hence the need to pay. Whether or not the programme
is eventually undertaken is dependent on the aggregate WTP. In view of budget constraints, the
programme can be undertaken on only one type of land”.
Thereafter, a two-stage approach was used. Firstly, respondents were asked how their households
weighed the costs and beneﬁts of the proposed programme on each land type, by considering only
those beneﬁts and costs applicable to them.11 Secondly, depending on their preferences for the
programme on each land type, the respondents were asked about the highest amount their household
was willing to pay as an annual conservation levy to ensure that such a programme was undertaken
/a v o i d e d 12 on the communal land, the municipal land or park land.13
Our approach so far enables the respondents to be classiﬁed into distinct categories based on
their perceived assessment of the potential beneﬁts and costs associated with the introduction of a
conservation project in their area. The challenge is how to deal with the potential zero WTP that
may be reported by respondents. This necessary information for handling the zeros will be obtained
through a follow-up debrieﬁng question. The protest bids (refusal to answer a valuation question
or citing zero bids other than for budget constraints reasons) will be omitted from the analysis, as
is standard procedure in CVM studies. This implies that all zero bids that are cited other than for
budget constraints reasons will be treated as valid bids.
The question used to capture this information requires a qualitative choice model. The logit and
probit models are the two most-used discrete choice models (Capps and Cramer 1985). The logit /
probit models are usually used where the dependent variable represents a qualitative response such
as selecting among a set of discrete choices. Such an approach fundamentally explains a binary
decision (dependent variable).
A number of studies have used the probit model-to-model winners and losers in non-market
valuation studies (e.g., Clinch and Murphy 2001; Muchapondwa et al. 2008). Thus, we prefer to
use the probit model with linear bids to validate whether the respondents behaved like economic
agents. We want to know the characteristics of people who win or lose, and since this is a binary
observation, the probit model is applied. We assume a WTP linear function (Muchapondwa et al.
2008):
WTP j = αzj + εj (1)
Where zj is a linear function of socio-economic characteristics, α is the corresponding parameter
vector and ε i sar a n d o me r r o rt e r m ,v a r( ε)=α2. In the case of the extreme value (logistical)
distribution, the individual j’s mean WTP is:
ln(1 + exp(αzj))/β (2)
Where β is the marginal utility of money (Köhlin 1995). The mean WTP for individual j is .
The median WTP may also be estimated readily for the normal and extreme value distributions
(Clinch and Murphy 2001). A binary decision of whether the respondents considered the proposed
conservation project to be either a public good or bad is used as the dependent variable. In these
10In this context, park land refers to either of the contract parks.
11Those respondents who indicated that the potential beneﬁts were greater than the potential costs (B>C) were
expected to have a non-negative WTP for the conservation programme. Those respondents who indicated that the
potential costs exceeded the potential beneﬁts (B<C) were expected to have a non-negative WTP for the avoidance
of the conservation programme.
12The logic behind those against the proposed programme but who are willing to pay is that their payment would
ensure that they would continue to undertake their current activities without any restrictions. This is because the
implementation of the programme would result in some land being set aside exclusively for the programme, and some
activities such as harvesting of overexploited medicinal plants might end up being prohibited or regulated.
13The respondents had to give three WTP answers in respect of three types of land. The type of land with the
highest stated WTP represents where the respondents would like the proposed project to be implemented.
7models, the coeﬃcients of the independent variables explain factors that inﬂuence the dependent
variables, ceteris paribus.
The WTP question in the case of implementation of the proposed biodiversity conservation
programme on communal land was as follows (refer to Appendix): “What is the maximum annual
conservation levy that your household would be willing to pay to SANParks (the conservation
agency) to implement a government conservation programme which seeks to plant as many native
trees, shrubs and grasslands on communal land14, as required speciﬁcally to reduce biodiversity loss
by 10%? Bearing in mind the other demands on your household income, pick your household’s
maximum annual conservation levy from the payment card.15 Note that SANParks would be bound
to use the levies so collected towards implementation of this programme only”.
In follow-up questions, the respondents were asked similar questions, supposing that the relevant
conservation authorities instead decided to implement the programme on either municipal land or
park land. Thus the programme was to be implemented on only one land type due to logistical
feasibility. In the event that respondents revealed in the ﬁrst set of questions that the potential
costs of the proposed biodiversity conservation programme exceeded its potential beneﬁts, they were
asked in the second set of questions about their maximum WTP to have the proposed biodiversity
conservation programme elsewhere.16 In all cases, the respondents were asked to state reasons
for their willingness to pay amounts across the biodiversity conservation programmes on either
communal or municipal lands or in the park.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics from the Survey
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the households surveyed.17 Where the respondents
were household members other than the heads, their responses were interpreted as coming from the
heads themselves.
The majority of the Khomani San respondents were males (i.e. 60%). Unemployment is very
high among these respondents, with only 32% having jobs, while 23% were self-employed. This is
unlike in the Mier community where almost everyone report some kind of employment, especially
self-employment. Thus, the livelihoods of the majority of the Khomani San have to be supported
from the natural environment or grants from the government. The Khomani also indicated that they
did not have access to electricity. It is therefore not surprising that all the respondents indicated
that they were involved in the collection of ﬁrewood. The Camelthorn tree is the only large tree in
the area; hence, it is the most harvested.
Harvesting of this tree for commercial purposes is prohibited. Despite eﬀorts to ensure that this
unique dry land species continues to thrive, some locals continue to harvest it for commercial purposes
due to lack of jobs and/or income-generating activities in their area. Harvesting of medicinal plants
was the second most popular activity that took place in the area with 77% saying that they were
involved in this activity. This was followed by collection of bush-food (54%), livestock farming (46%),
permitted hunting (24%) and making of crafts (13%). This information is evidence of how heavily
14Suppose that logistical arrangements determine that it is only feasible to implement the project on communal
land.
15This study used the payment card method with 13 bids ranging from R0-R4,000. In addition, provision was made
for any respondents who might have wished to state any other amount not shown on the card.
16This suggests that if they do not want the programme, it has to be taken elsewhere and that they should contribute
to the costs of its implementation there (or its prevention from their area). Thus, they would be paying for remote
conservation as opposed to intimate conservation.
17This sub-section splits the analysis by ethnic groups, namely the Khomani San people and the Mier Community,
each with a sample size of 100. The sample size of 100 should be understood in the context of the small population
sizes of indigenous people. The Khomani San have a total estimated population of 320 households, thus 100 represents
a fair representation. It is in this context that the Khomani San sample size in this study is considered adequate.
The reason for splitting by ethnic groups was due to the two groups being distinct. Splitting will therefore give us
valuable insight into the kind of economic incentive schemes that may be appropriate to each group.
8dependent the Khomani San people are on nature. An overwhelming majority (86%) indicated that
they did not hunt, grazed their livestock, collected bush-food or harvest ﬁrewood on municipal land.
About 77% of the Khomani San respondents had visited the park sometime in the past, prior
to the time the survey was carried out. This is important because it means that most respondents
had an idea of what conservation aimed to achieve. This is particularly critical for the Khomani
San people given that most respondents had not even completed primary education. Their main
reason for visiting the park was to undertake traditional and cultural activities. Of the activities
undertaken by the Khomani San inside the Park, only a few indicated that it was for harvesting of
medicinal plants. The traditional doctors were the main harvesters of medicinal plants inside the
contract park.
About 83% of the Khomani San respondents said they took part in pro-environmental activity
in their homes. Their pro-environmental activity mainly involved keeping their homes clean and
planting ﬂowers. This is essential because it indicates that the respondents are interested in looking
after the environment. All that is required is to ﬁnd ways to take this a step further by investigating
how to motivate people to adapt the same attitude with regard to native biodiversity eﬀorts.
When asked whether they would physically volunteer their own labour to take part in any
conservation activity inside their communal land, on municipal land and inside their contractual
park, 78%, 66% and 63% said yes respectively. Most said yes to a conservation activity inside the
communal land because they felt that the beneﬁts would accrue directly to them. Some of those who
said no were due to old age or ill health. Given their resource rights inside the contract park, it was
surprising that it had the lowest willing participants. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the diﬀerence
between the two categories is marginal.
The same question was also put to the Mier respondents; 83%, 70% and 78% respectively said
yes. In contrast to the Khomani San, volunteering inside the park had the second highest willing
participants after communal land. It is however encouraging that an overwhelming majority would
be prepared to volunteer on both communal and municipal land, as this is where loss of biodiversity
usually happens. This information is critical because it shows that most people are already positive
about conservation.
A majority (53%) of the Khomani San respondents had partial knowledge of what would happen
i ft h e r ew e r et ob eas i g n i ﬁcant degradation of the environment because of their overexploitation
of resources. Food insecurity was the most cited impact that would result because of signiﬁcant
degradation. Only 27% of respondents were well informed about the potential impact of degradation.
Despite only 58% having an idea about the potential impact of overexploitation, about 81% said
they would compromise their living situation to conserve the environment.
When asked who they thought was primarily responsible for conserving nature in the Kgalagadi
area, 43% said that it was the community itself. Those who felt that it was a responsibility of
all stakeholders, accounted for 37%; 14% said it was the government’s responsibility. Most (62%)
described their relationship with nature as that of man and the natural environment having equal
rights. The remaining 21% were of the view that man was the steward of nature. A minority (25%)
of Khomani San respondents indicated that they would relocate if there were substantial degradation
of the environment.
As is the case with the Khomani San, a large majority of the Mier respondents (63%) were
males. Unemployment levels (those actively looking for work) were also very high among this group,
at 79%. However, the Mier’s household income was signiﬁcantly higher than that of the Khomani
San households. About 66% of the Mier were involved in livestock farming. The 79% unemployment
ﬁgure comes from those involved in livestock farming as they indicated that they were involved solely
in livestock farming due to lack of jobs. They indicated that they would prefer to work and have
livestock at the same time as their livestock sizes were very small.
In contrast to the Khomani San, all the Mier community members had access to electricity;
hence, only 33% were involved in ﬁrewood collection. However, ﬁrewood collection was the second
most undertaken activity among this group, followed by medicinal plant harvesting and bush food
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their heavy dependence on livestock farming. A small proportion of respondents (24%) indicated
that they also collected ﬁrewood on municipal land.
An overwhelming 73% of the Mier respondents had visited the park in the past. Their reason
for visiting the park was mainly for recreational reasons. Unlike the Khomani San people, the
Mier pay an entrance fee18 whenever they visit the park. When asked if they participated in any
pro-environmental activities in their homes, 76% said yes. The pro-environmental activities that
they undertook mainly involved planting of trees (ﬂowers) and maintaining their homes by keeping
them clean. This is important as it shows that the respondents are interested in looking after the
environment. This can be taken a step forward by ﬁnding ways to motivate them to have the same
approach with regard to native biodiversity eﬀorts.
The amount of education years of the household head ﬂuctuated among the Mier respondents
from 0 years (those that never attended school) to 12 years (those that completed Matric — ﬁnished
high school). Only 2% of the respondents ﬁnished college education. Most of the respondents (55%
and 31%) had partial and full knowledge respectively about the impacts of a signiﬁcant degradation
on the environment due to overgrazing or overexploitation.
When asked who was primarily responsible for conserving the environment, 44% of the Mier
said it was the community, 31% said it was all stakeholders and 16% felt that it was a government
responsibility. They were also asked how they best deﬁned their relationship with the natural
environment; slightly more than half (53%) said that man and the environment had equal rights,
while 28% indicated that man was the steward of the environment. An overwhelming majority of
respondents (76%) indicated that they would still live in the area even if the environment was to
degrade substantially.
It is clear from the discussions above that both ethnic groups are to varying degrees heavily
dependent on nature as a source of livelihood. Once we obtained background socio-economic in-
formation from the respondents, we then asked them three contingent valuation questions about
their willingness to pay for native planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands on either communal land,
municipal land and inside the contractual park.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Validity and Reliability Tests
The conventional CVM survey asks respondents to state their WTP for a commodity in monetary
units based in a hypothetical scenario. The technique is prone to bias because of its reliance on
a hypothetical scenario. It is for this reason that it is critical that the CVM study should entail
assessing the credibility of the estimates. In the case of this study, the assessment consists of
construct/theoretical tests.
In addition to the validity, it is desirable to test for reliability of results. The objective of testing
for reliability is to see if the results can be replicated by running the technique under exactly the
same conditions. When the technique is repeated, the diﬀerence in the results should be statistically
insigniﬁcant (Hanley and Spash 1993). Our validity test entails estimating the determinants of
respondents’ WTP. Knowledge of the characteristics of those households who are likely to consider
the project in question as bad could assist in terms of designing incentive schemes that may motivate
them to enhance biodiversity in the area.
One of the objectives of this study is to explain the factors that theoretically inﬂuence the
dependent variable and expectations in terms of their associated signs. Such an analysis sheds light
on the robustness of the study. From a policy point of view, the identiﬁcation of such factors sheds
18The Khomani San people do not pay entrance fees because of having special “resource” rights inside the park.
As a result, they have a separate entrance point to the park so they can go for meetings in the park.
10some light to the type of appropriate compensation incentive schemes that may be suitable for the
landscape in question.
Since we are dealing with household-level data, household characteristics such as age of house-
hold head, education level, household’s annual taxable income, knowledge about consequences of
biodiversity loss, having visited the park in the past and participating in some pro-environmental
activities at home, are expected to be vital in explaining the households’ WTP for the proposed
conservation project.
It is logical to think that households that have visited the park at some point in the past would
view planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands as good. One of the main objectives behind parks is
to create awareness about biodiversity conservation. Having visited the park in the past is more
likely to help one to relate positively with conservation and associated secondary beneﬁts such as
job creation and contribution of tourism in the area.
Older people are more in contact with nature, are more likely to have experienced environmental
degradation over time, and because of having experienced changes with regard to accessing certain
resources, are expected to view conservation of biodiversity as essential.
Household heads with higher education are expected to comprehend the urgency to protect
nature. The Khomani San’s indigenous knowledge of medicinal properties is expected to inﬂuence
WTP.
The level of knowledge that households have with regard to the consequence of a signiﬁcant
degradation of the environment due to overexploitation is expected to inﬂuence people’s view about
conservation in the area. Household heads with some knowledge about what might happen if there
is a signiﬁcant degradation of the environment are expected to view the proposed programme as a
public good. Households that take part in pro-environmental activities such as planting of trees in
their homes are expected to be in favour of the proposed project.
Household income is expected to be critical in explaining WTP for the proposed project. Income
levels in the area are relatively low and, as a result, people are generally dependent on nature
for a wide variety of activities (e.g., livestock farming, medicinal plant harvesting and bush-food
resources). However, households with low income are expected to be the most aﬀected by the impact
of biodiversity loss in the area, as compared to those with relatively higher income levels, ceteris
paribus. The type of activities undertaken on communal land, and whether one undertakes them
either on the municipal land or inside the park, will inﬂuence how people perceive the conservation
project in question on diﬀerent types of land.
The probit model results of whether planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands is good are set out
in the table 4.1 below. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
The results, ceteris paribus, suggest age and collection of bush-food resources are signiﬁcant
factors that inﬂuence people’s perceptions about the planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands on
communal land, municipal land (land owned by the municipality) and as well as on perceptions
inside the contractual park. The Khomani San people in particular have resource rights inside the
park, and harvesting of medicinal plants, walkabouts and collection of bush food are already some
of the activities that they undertake in the park. Those involved in these activities would directly
beneﬁt more; hence, it is not surprising that households that took part in collection of bush-food
resources are more likely to view the proposed project as a public good. These households have
lower income, hence, their heavy dependence on bush-food. This is in line with our expectations
that households that derive their livelihoods from on-farm activities that may be positively aﬀected
by the proposed project, were more likely to be in favour of a conservation project on communal land.
The results suggest that older household heads are less informed about conservation of biodiversity.
Another point that stands out in these results is that household size was inﬂuential to people’s
perceptions about the proposed conservation project on communal land. Households with many
members have a higher probability of viewing implementation of the project on communal land as a
public bad. This may be because bigger households are probably involved in collecting ﬁrewood on
municipal land where there is little or no monitoring at all. The implementation of the project could
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implementation of the proposed project on communal land include employment, household annual
taxable income and hunting.
Households that were involved in hunting have a higher probability of seeing the proposed pro-
gramme as undesirable. The negative sign of the hunting coeﬃcient implies that those involved view
the project as going to impose further restrictions on those involved in this activity. Thus those
involved in hunting perceive the project as a public bad. Given that the Mier Local Municipality
region is characterised by high unemployment and low household income levels, the employment
status and income levels mattered. The negative sign of both the coeﬃcients implies those employed
and households with low income levels perceive the project as a public bad.
Furthermore, the view that the beneﬁts of conserving biodiversity exceeded associated costs on
municipal land inﬂuenced the positive view towards the proposed project on municipal land. The
impression that can be drawn from these results is that the level of education can change the view of
those who perceive the proposed project as a public bad, as this is mostly borne out of low education
or lack knowledge on the issue. Although only a minority of people viewed the project as a public bad
on municipal land, it is important that attempts should be made to convince them that the project
is indeed beneﬁcial in the long term. This would increase the likelihood of the project succeeding, as
the community would be involved as a collective. Education levels of household heads are signiﬁcant
as this would increase understanding of the urgency to protect nature better. Moreover, undertaking
of some communal activities on municipal land such as bush food collection was an important factor
that determined perceptions about conservation on municipal land.
Households that participated in some pro-environmental activities at home viewed the project as
a public good. This is because they expect to beneﬁt directly from the implementation of the project
inside the park. Although only the Khomani San people have resource rights, implementation of such
a project could lead to job opportunities, and it is in this regard that both groups (local communities)
would beneﬁt as they are given preference. Another point that stands out is that the view regarding
the statement that best deﬁnes the individual’s relationship to the natural environment inﬂuenced
the negative view towards the proposed project in the contractual park.
The results from the table above suggest that the Mier people are not in favour (volunteering
own labour to take part in conservation) - public bad, of the implementation of the proposed project
on municipal land. However, the results give insight into the factors that inﬂuence their views. This
information is important and should be taken into consideration when designing an incentive scheme
should the project be extended to municipal land.
One critical observation from these analyses is that those who want to contribute labour also
have a WTP > 0. It is on this basis that the problem of those people who would want to pay, but not
in the form of cash, is not encountered in this study. Thus, money WTP is not biased downwards.
The motivation for having the Mier dummy variable is to check and compare for any systematic
diﬀerences between the Khomani San and the Mier. This variable is not signiﬁcant in any land
tenure regime, suggesting that factors that inﬂuence the indigenous people’s WTP are statistically
not diﬀerent from those of non-indigenous people.
4.2 Willingness-To-Pay for Planting of Native Trees Shrubs and Grass-
lands
In addition to reporting the mean and median WTP according to ethnic groups, this sub-section
goes further by reporting according to those who are in favour of the proposed conservation project
and those against the project. WTP analysis to support planting programmes is split into three
areas. The table below shows the WTP for and against the proposed initiative.
The full sample size for each group is 100 (N=100). Almost all the Khomani San respondents
supported conservation on communal land, while 79% were in favour of such an initiative on both
municipal land and inside the Park. The mean WTP of R60.60 for supporting the conservation
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income. A point to note is that although the mean WTP to prevent the initiative from being im-
plemented (negative WTP) is higher (R70.63, which represents 0.27% of their mean annual income)
relative for support, the former group represents a minority of 8% of the total Khomani San re-
spondents. In contrast, the Mier preferred implementation of the initiative on municipal land, with
88% WTP, while 88% and 74% would support it on communal land and inside their contractual
park respectively. While the mean WTP in support of planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands on
communal land by the Mier is R146.45 (0.33% of their mean annual income) the mean WTP to
prevent the programme from being implemented is R85.59 (negative WTP), which represents 0.20%
of their mean annual income.
While the mean WTP in support of the project on municipal land and inside the contract park by
the Khomani San was R38.42 and R30.89 respectively (0.15% and 0.12% of their annual household
income), the mean against the project in these areas is R7.31 and R7.00 — negative WTP (0.03% of
their annual income respectively). In the case of the Mier, their WTP on municipal land and inside
the park is R70.06 and R40.27 respectively (0.16% and 0.09% of their annual income), while the
mean for those against the initiative are R15.83 and R55.96 (0.04% and 0.13% of annual household
income).
The median WTP in support of planting trees, shrubs and grasslands on communal land, munic-
ipal land and inside the park by the Khomani San people are R15.00, R5.00 and R15.00 respectively
(which represents 0.06%, 0.02% and 0.06% of their median household annual income). The median
WTP against the programme on the communal land is R10 (which represents 0.04 of their annual
household income). Furthermore, the median WTP against is R5 both on municipal land and inside
the park, which accounts for 0.02% of their median annual income.
As for the Mier, the median WTP in support of biodiversity conservation is R25 (0.06% of median
annual income) on communal land, R5 on municipal land (0.01% of their median annual income)
and R15 inside the park (0.03% of their median annual income). The median WTP to prevent
the programme is R75 (0.17% median annual income) on communal land, R10 (0.02% of median
household income per annum) on municipal land and R15 (accounts for 0.03% of median income
per year) inside the contract park.
Overall, the majority of respondents from both groups were willing to support the proposed
conservation initiative on communal land, municipal land and inside their contractual park. Both
groups were WTP the highest amount (in terms of the mean and median WTP) for planting of trees
on their communal land. This implies that both communities are similar in that they assign more
value when they control the asset. The main reason for WTP more on communal land as compared
to on municipal land and inside the contract park was that they felt that they would directly get more
beneﬁts. These results suggest that the respondents from both groups would prefer the proposed
project to be implemented on communal land. Given the intimate connection to the restored land
both inside and outside the park, the land claim deal will only prove to be good for biodiversity
conservation if the local communities are good environmental stewards.
A decision has to be made about how to identify the outliers, as well as what to do with them.
As an alternative to omitting outliers, the problem they cause is often addressed by the use of
a median rather than a mean WTP (Hanley and Spash, 1993). The median WTP measure was
preferred because of the presence of outliers in the data. The Mier respondents were WTP just
under two times more in annual levies (R25) than the Khomani San (R15) in terms of being in
favour of biodiversity conservation in their communal area. However, when adjusted for annual
median household income, there are no diﬀerences between the two groups’ WTP. It is clear that
the median values alone presented a biased picture.
A similar biased picture was true with regard to the magnitude of WTP in support of biodiversity
enhancement on municipal and inside the contractual park between the two groups. According to the
median WTP values, the Khomani San are WTP equal amounts in annual levies for conservation on
municipal land and inside the park. However, when adjusted for median annual household income,
13the Khomani San were actually WTP to pay two times in annual levies for conservation on municipal
land and inside the park respectively.
The same logic also applies when comparing the negative WTP for biodiversity enhancement
between the two groups. The Mier were WTP just under eight times more than the Khomani San to
prevent the project. Although this diﬀerence is still signiﬁcant, adjusted household median income
suggests that the Mier were actually WTP just over four times more in levies per annum than
t h eK h o m a n iS a nt op r e v e n tt h ep r o g r a m m ei nt h ep a r k . T h eM i e rw e r eW T Pt w i c et h ea m o u n t
to prevent the proposed planting of trees on municipal land. However adjusted median income
estimates suggests that the Mier and Khomani San were WTP the same in annual levies to stop
conservation on municipal land. In the case of the contract park, the Mier were WTP three times
more than the Khomani San to prevent the project. Adjusted household median income suggests
that the Mier were actually WTP just under two times more in levies per annum than the Khomani
San to prevent the programme in the park.
Adjusted median household income analysis suggests that there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the magnitude of both the positive and negative WTP for planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands
in all designated areas. The diﬀerence between the Khomani and Mier is signiﬁcant and should be
taken into consideration when designing the type of economic incentive schemes needed in the area.
The breaking down of WTP according to ethnic groups and preferences for and against biodiversity
conservation has given us valuable insight into an in-depth understanding of the diﬀerences in WTP
values and the magnitude of the negative WTP against biodiversity enhancement schemes in the
area.
We took the analysis from table two a step further by estimating the total WTP for those in
support and those against the implementation of the planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands in
the designated areas. To do this, a cost-beneﬁt analysis is applied to determine the net worth
of biodiversity enhancement. As stated earlier, an overwhelming majority of the Khomani San
people (92%) support conservation on communal land, 79% on municipal land and inside the park
respectively. About 83% of the Mier respondents are in favour of the programme on communal
land and 88% were WTP to support the initiative on municipal land, while 74% were in favour of a
similar project inside the contract park.
The results from the table above suggest that the gainers from the proposed programme of
planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands would beneﬁtm o r es i g n i ﬁcantly as compared to the losers.
The net worth for conserving biodiversity by the Khomani San on communal land is marginally
higher than inside the park and signiﬁcantly higher than on municipal land. The diﬀerence in the
net worth in diﬀerent areas among the Mier was similar to that of the San, with a net worth on both
communal land and inside the park been signiﬁcantly more than on municipal land. Interestingly,
the Mier preferred implementation of the project on municipal land, followed by on communal land
and on the contractual park respectively. Nonetheless, it is perhaps not surprising that the net worth
for both groups (local communities) was signiﬁcantly less on municipal land relative to other areas,
as they do not have any land rights there. Overall, more people would beneﬁts i g n i ﬁcantly from
conservation of biodiversity in the Kgalagadi area. The fact that the majority are in favour of the
programme is a good argument for biodiversity conservation in the Kgalagadi landscape as a whole.
The results from the table show that the respondents have a signiﬁcant WTP for biodiversity in the
area as a whole, therefore reﬂecting their value for biodiversity conservation.
4.3 The role of Economic Incentives in Biodiversity Conservation
One of the main concerns raised by policy-makers is that although they are aware of the importance
and contributions of conserving biodiversity, their eﬀorts are undermined by its undervaluation or
lack of it, which ultimately results in overexploitation. This study provides this value (assigned by
local communities living adjacent to the park) by taking into consideration both winners and losers
because of the implementation of the proposed project. In the context of this study, the net worth
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biodiversity might be enhanced through planting of trees, shrubs and grasslands on communal land.
The estimation of the value of biodiversity conservation in this study does not only provide this
particular value, but also highlights issues that need to be addressed to achieve sustainable resource
use. Non-existent or inadequate economic incentives have been identiﬁed as one of the main reasons
for biodiversity loss.
Economic incentives refer to mechanisms that change the behaviour of actors with respect to
economic choices by altering their economic conditions. They can be positive or negative. Positive
economic incentives reward actors for complying with required actions, while negative economic
incentives punish actors for non-compliance. There are two main types of incentives, namely direct
and indirect. Direct incentives can be either ﬁnancial or other inducements and indirect incentives
are a combination of variable and enabling incentives (Knowler 1999).
Variable incentives are intended among others to inﬂuence the behaviour of the supplier and
the demanders. Enabling incentives are those policy instruments and institutional arrangements
that form a conducive environment for the productivity and consumption of goods and services.
Examples of enabling incentives with regard to natural resource use in the case of communities that
live adjacent to national parks and in national parks include provision of land and resource rights,
information and education.
Economic incentives play a pivotal role in nature conservation at all levels of society, particularly
at community levels (Emerton 2001). The use of incentives is an attempt to induce eﬀective and
sustainable use of natural resources. It is highly likely that local communities, particularly those that
live within close proximity to national parks, will only be willing and able to use natural resources
in a sustainable way if they were to have signiﬁcant tangible economic beneﬁts accruing to them.
The fundamental idea behind economic incentive in biodiversity is to change people’s behaviour
with regard to natural resource management. Economic incentives require the identiﬁcation, and
overcoming of, the broader economic conditions and forces that inﬂuence people to degrade the
environment.
Many studies show that economic incentives have been used worldwide in diﬀerent forms with
mixed results. Empirical evidence shows that if the appropriate economic instruments are imple-
mented, the desired behaviour that is consistent with enhancement of conservation can be achieved.
Setting up of economic incentives is complex and diﬃcult, and varies across diﬀerent areas, commu-
nities and cultures. It is vital that conservation is economically desirable to local communities in a
way that will improve household welfare as well as nature.
T h er o l et h a te c o n o m i cb e n e ﬁts bring to protected areas such as national parks and their sur-
rounding areas, as well as the contribution of economic incentives in conservation is now widely
acknowledged. The need to include economics among a mix of other disciplines is required for a
successful management of protected areas. While it is acknowledged that a wide variety of beneﬁts
of many services oﬀered by biodiversity are diﬃcult for individual users to capture as they exhibit
public goods characteristics, economic incentive schemes have evolved over time. Furthermore, it is
vital that the point at which the market failure aﬀects the participants’ ability to capture the full
economic beneﬁts of conservation is understood.
Property rights frequently are applied as economic incentives for local communities who normally
use natural resources or live in biodiversity landscapes. The awarding of community property rights
in protected areas is gaining popularity (Emerton 2000). The community property rights have
already been allocated to Khomani San people and the Mier community. The rights to use the land
under this regime are exclusively assigned to all members of the Khomani San and Mier community
in their respective areas.
The application of appropriate valuation tools is a key element of policies that aim to correct the
“perverse” incentives of societal actors. The estimation of the value of biodiversity is an essential
precondition to the internalisation of this value in decision-making (CBD 2010). This is useful
and worthwhile, as it may assist in convincing decision-makers of the need to conserve biodiversity
15(Vorhies 2010). In addition, by raising awareness among societal actors of the values of biodiversity,
valuation can also act as an incentive measure in its own right (CBD 2010).
Thus, understanding of the values of biodiversity is a critical step forward, as these values
illustrate that conservation brings a variety of economic beneﬁts and therefore justiﬁes the need
for policy makers to arrange funding for biodiversity programmes such as the one proposed in this
study.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Our study contributes in addressing the degradation problem by providing the kind of information
that sheds some light as to which incentive mechanisms are likely to be feasible, in addition to
estimating the net value of changes in biodiversity for diﬀerent areas of the Kgalagadi landscape for
diﬀerent ethnic groups. Determination of the net worth demonstrates local communities’ preferences
as to the area where the proposed project should be implemented.
Environmental degradation arises due to a combination of institutional failures, market failures
and policy failures. All these failures are interdependent (Bulte 2003). Failure to allocate appropriate
economic values to biodiversity is one of the most important factors underlying causes of biodiversity
losses (Thies 2000). The value of biodiversity represents what we as a society are willing to trade
oﬀ to conserve natural resources (Pascual et al. 2010). Conservation is critical for sustainable
development, as it is in the value of the natural resources that individuals may begin to comprehend
t h er o l et oc o n s e r v et h e mf o rf u t u r eu s e s( D u ﬀy, Corson and Grant 2001).
A lack of property rights has being identiﬁed widely in the literature as one of the main driving
factors for biodiversity loss. Enabling incentives in the form of the provision of land and resource
rights have been awarded to the local communities in the Kgalagadi area. These indirect incentives
seem not to be adequate, because of a public good characteristic associated with them.
The main challenge is that the rights were not given to private individuals; hence, it is highly
unlikely that these incentives will work eﬃciently. The continued loss of biodiversity in the Kgalagadi
landscape proves that the causes are rooted in socio-economic and institutional factors. Incentive
schemes that seek to address these driving factors are crucial if this trend is to be reversed. It
is critical that the culture and livelihoods of the local communities are taken into consideration if
conservation initiatives are to succeed.
In the Kgalagadi area, people continue to harvest the endangered Camelthorn tree for both
household and commercial use, despite the ban on the latter activity. One of the reasons for not
complying with the ban is because of lack of job opportunities in the area and the need to generate
income. The economic beneﬁt from this continued unsustainable activity outweighs other alternative
conservation choices. As long as this trend holds, the greater economic and ﬁnancial beneﬁts gained
from degrading such environmental (tree) resources rather than conserving them, local communities
are unlikely to change their unsustainable economic activities. The need for additional incentive
schemes in the Kgalagadi area is becoming even more critical, given that the area has diﬀerent
stakeholders with varying degrees of dependence on nature.
The harvesting of medicinal plants, collection of bush-food, hunting and livestock farming are
some of the most popular activities that are undertaken in the area as a whole. Destructive har-
vesting of medicinal plants, together with overgrazing, remains a serious concern. The people in the
Kgalagadi area are directly heavily dependent on natural resources and, given their socio-economic
conditions, are likely to overexploit the resources if further incentive systems are not implemented.
The fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents view implementation of the proposed
conservation project as a public good in all areas is evidence that there is a signiﬁcant interest on their
part in addressing biodiversity loss in their region. Given budget constraints, the people indicated
that they would prefer that the project be implemented on communal land. This is a positive sign,
as this is primarily where the resources are being overexploited. The relevant authorities should
16take advantage of these positive perceptions about conservation by creating the environment that
will encourage the local communities to use their resources in a more sustainable way.
Despite high unemployment in the area and low household income levels, most people were
willing to pay to support sound conservation initiative. Many people had partial knowledge about
the negative impact of biodiversity loss to their livelihoods, despite the low levels of education. Most
of the knowledge about nature came from traditional knowledge. For example, a large number of
respondents who indicated that they harvested medicinal plants indicated that they were aware that
at times their harvesting techniques were destructive and were willing to adopt environmentally
friendly ways of harvesting if only there knew how.
The ﬁndings suggest that South Africa’s Khomani San, whose attitudes towards modern con-
servation have not been evaluated until now, and the adjacent Mier community, generally attach a
signiﬁcant economic value to biodiversity in their area. The net worth for conserving biodiversity
conservation on various resource tenure regimes by the Khomani San ranged from R928 to R4 672
relative to the Mier’s R25 600 to R64 000. However, in order for all members of the local commu-
nities to support biodiversity conservation unconditionally, mechanisms for fair distribution of the
associated costs and beneﬁts should be put in place.
Most importantly, our study has demonstrated that although the Khomani San are new to the
money economy, their value of biodiversity conservation on diﬀerent land tenures is no diﬀerent
from that of an average South African community — in the case of our study, the Mier community.
The diﬀerence reported in terms of net worth is mainly due to the signiﬁcantly smaller relative
size of the Khomani San’s population. The real value can be seen in terms of annual WTP for
and against planting of native trees, shrubs and grasslands on various land tenure regimes. This
paper has demonstrated that the proposed conservation initiative does indeed lead to winners and
losers, even in situations where the people are heavily dependent on nature. One would have easily
made an assumption that, given the levels of dependence, that it was logical and reasonable to
assume that all would beneﬁt. The identiﬁcation of both gainers and losers has serious policy
implications. The ﬁndings of this study suggest that the respondents have a signiﬁcant willingness-
to-pay for biodiversity on communal land, municipal land and inside the park, which reﬂects their
value for biodiversity conservation. These results further illustrate that gainers from the proposed
conservation programme would beneﬁtm o r es i g n i ﬁcantly than the losers, implying that the local
communities could be trusted to support biodiversity conservation if mechanisms for fair distribution
of the associated costs and beneﬁts are put in place.
In general, the ﬁndings in this paper show that the proposed project has passed a cost-beneﬁt
assessment test19. Failure to incorporate the negative WTP into the cost-beneﬁt analysis would
have ampliﬁed the magnitude of the net worth and/or most likely led to a signiﬁcant number of
protest bids.
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21Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics from the Survey 








Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Household size  5.37   3.09   5.59  3.03  5.48  3.057 
Ever visited the park (1=Y, 0=N)   0.77   0.42   0.73  0.45  0.75  0.43 
Age of household head  46.84   15.15   47.79  14.35  47.32  14.73 
Gender of head (1=M, 0=F)  0.60   0.49  0.63  0.49  0.62  0.49 
Years Lived at Property  10.10   9.14   16.49   12.83   13.30  11.57 
Education Years of Household Head 
 
4.98   3.62   5.9  3.97  5.44  3.82 
Work for wages
1 of Household Head  0.32   0.47   0.21  0.41  0.27  0.44 
Self  Employed    (1=Y,  0=N)  of  
Household Head 
0.23   0.42   0.54  0.50  0.39  0.49 
Knowledgeable  about  the  effects  of 
biodiversity loss (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.58   0.50   0.67  0.47  0.63  0.48 
Household Income (Rands)   26 400.0
0  
28 462.98   43 500.
00 
80 977.30   34 950.
00  
61 144.84  
Primary  responsibility  (1  = 
Government,  2  =  SANParks,  3  = 
community,  4=donors,  5  =  all 
stakeholders 
3.44  1.39  3.25  1.388  3.33  1.37 
Relationship to nature (1 = service of 
man, 2 = steward of nature, 3 = nature 
independent, 4 = equal rights) 
3.37  0.88  3.21  0.92  3.23  0.97 
Can  compromise  own  living  for 
biodiversity (1=Y, 0=N) 
0.81  0.39  0.77  0.42   0.83  0.39 
Collects firewood (1=Y, 0=N)   0.80   0.40   0.33   0.47   0.57  0.50  
Uses medicinal plants (1=Y, 0=N)   0.77   0.42   0.25   0.44   0.51  0.50 
Bush Food Collection (1=Y, 0=N)   0.54   0.50   0.20   0.40   0.37   0.48  
Involved in Livestock Farming (1=Y, 
0=N)  
0.46   0.50  0.96  0.21  0.56   0.50  
Involved  in  Game  Farming  (1=Y, 
0=N)  
0.06   0.24   0.13   0.34   0.10   0.29  
Growing  plants  and  trees  in  the 
household’s plot (1=Y, 0=N)   
0.03   0.17   0.10   0.30   0.07   0.25 
Involved in legal hunting   0.24   0.43   0  0  0.23  0.42 
Make Crafts   0.13   0.34   0.12  0.33  0.13   0.33 
Activities  on  Municipal  Land 
(livestock  farming,  firewood 
collection,  medicinal  plants 
harvesting and bush-food collection) 
0.14  0.35  0.41   0.49   0.28  0.45 
Activities inside Contract Park   0.65  0.48  0  0  0.33  0.47 
Decides if to Participate   0.50  0.50  0.53  0.50  0.52  0.50 
Home Part of Nature   0.86  0.35  0.84  0.37  0.85  0.36 
Protect Environment   0.83  0.38  0.76  0.43   0.79  0.41 
Substantial Reduction   0.75  0.44  0.76  0.43  0.76  0.43 
No. of Observations  100  100  100  100  200  200 
 
   
                                                           
1  Codes; 1 = yes & 0 = no. These codes were  also used for the following variables; self employment, firewood 
collection,  medicinal  plant  usage,  bush-food  collection,  involvement  in  livestock  farming,  game  farming, 
agriculture, hunting, making crafts, take part in activities in a Municipal land, activities inside the park, decide if to 




Table 4.1: Determinants of Favouring the Proposed Conservation on Different Land Types 
Probit Regression       
  Dependent Variable: Willing to physically volunteer own labour
2 
 
Number of obs = 200 
On communal land   On municipal land  Inside the park  
Variable  Coef. and standard errors 
Mier Dummy  -0.5572   
(0.4761) ) 
0.0553   
(0.3524)  
-0.5829   
(0.4305)  
Household size  -0.0879 ***  
(0.0412)  
) 
-0.0243   
(0.0348)  
-0.0495   
(0.0375)  
Visited the Park  0.2937   
(0.2990)  
0.0452   
(0.2574)  
0.1154   
(0.2793)  
Age of household head (HH)  -0.0370 *** 
(0.0106)  
-0.0308 ***  
(0.0090)  
-0.0233 ***  
(0.0096) 
Gender of HH  -0.2179   
(0.2771)  
0.2032   
(0.2354)   
0.2836   
(0.2411)  
Years lived at current area   -0.0082   
(0.0113)  
0.0105   
(0.0097)  
0.0010   
(0.0105)  
Employed  -0.7963 *** 
(0.2949)  
-0.3893   
(0.2498)  
0.0006   
(0.2701)  
Self Employed  0.1700   
(0.3482)   
-0.0489   
(0.2772)  
0.2592   
(0.3183)  
Decision about participation    -0.1364  
(0.2771)  








-0.0281   
(0.0339)  






Home part of Nature  -0.3159   
(0.3567)   
-0.4656   
(0.3183)  
0.1598   
(0.3097)  
Participate in pro-environmental   0.3244   
(0.3321)   




Knowledge about degradation  0.1688   
(0.3155)  
0.3832   
(0.2618)  
0.0894   
(0.2672)  
Main activities on communal land       
Livestock farming  -0.0289   
(0.3161)  
-0.2939   
(0.2754)  
0.0078   
(0.2835)  
Hunting  -1.0613 ***  
(0.4029)  
-0.2118   
(0.3944)  
-0.7036   
(0.3666)  
Medicinal plant harvesting  0.1037   
(0.4006)  
0.0786   
(0.3153)  
0.3244   
(0.3564)  
Collection of bush-food  0.9424 *** 
(0.3797)  




Firewood collection  0.1617   
(0.3648)  
-0.3833   
(0.3040)   
0.5700   
(0.3278) 
Game Farming  -0.0140   
(0.5059)  
-0.0665   
(0.4021)  
0.0439   
(0.3907)  
                                                           





Crafts  -0.7216  
(0.4020)  
-0.6934   
(0.3989)  
-0.4208   
(0.3943)  




0.3222   
(0.3237)  
Activities inside the park   0.6663   
(0.4239)  
-0.0197   
(0.3443)  
0.4696   
(0.3687)  
Substantial Reduction  -0.2451   
(0.3259)  
0.1868   
(0.2490)  
-0.3984   
(0.3080)  
Primary responsibility   -0.0917   
(0.2875)  
0.0647   
(0.2232)  
0.1440   
(0.27110 
Define relationship to nature  -0.3275   
(0.3136)  
-0.1667   
(0.2444)  
-0.7138 ***  
(0.2674)  






-0.0329   
(0.2896)  
B>C (Communal land)  0.5921   
(0.4322)  








0.0415   
(0.4074) 




0.8096   
(0.4653)  
Constant  2.4504 *** 
(1.0008)  




 ***=5% level of significance 
 
Table 4.2:  Annual WTP for and against Proposed Conservation on Communal Land, 
Municipal Land and inside the Contract Park 
  Conservation Support  Against Conservation  
  (B>C)  (B<C) 





















































































Table 4.3: The Benefit-Cost Analysis for Biodiversity Conservation 
  Preferences  N  Sub-population 
Median 
WTP  BCA 
Khomani San           
Communal Land  B>C  92  0.92*320=294.40   15  R 4 416.00 
  B<C  8  0.08*320=25.60  -10  R -256.00 
    100  320    R 4 672.00 
           
Municipal  Land 
WTP  B>C  79  0.79*320=252.80  5  R 1 264.00 
  B<C  21  0.21*320=67.20  -5  R -336.00 
    100  320   
R 928.00 
 
           
Contractual Park  B>C  79  0.79*320=252.80  15  R 3 792.00 
  B<C  21  0.21*320=67.20  -5  R -336.00 
    100  320    R 3 456.00 
MIER           
Communal Land  B>C  83  0.83*8000=6640  25  R 166 000.00  
  B<C  17  0.17*8000=1360  -75  R -102 000.00  
    100  8000    R 64 000.00  
           
Municipal  Land 
WTP  B>C  88  0.88*8000=7040  5  R 35 200.00  
  B<C  12  0.12*8000=960  -10  R -9 600.00  
    100  8000    R 25 600.00  
           
Contractual Park  B>C  74  0.74*8000=5920  25  R 88 800.00  
  B<C  26  0.26*8000=2080  -15  R -31 200.00  
    100  8000    R 57 600.00  
 





Environmental questionnaire– community Issue on the economic benefits of biodiversity 
conservation 
 
This questionnaire assesses the land use choices in the Kgalagadi area. We would like to know your 
views regarding conservation projects on communal land, inside the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and 
on public land. Your views have important implications for the eventual form of economic incentive to be 
provided to the local people. 
NB:  There  are  no  right  or  wrong  answers  to  this  survey.  We  want  to  know  how  you  feel  about 
conservation programmes.   
                                                                                                                                                       
(A)NAME OF PERSON ADMINISTERING QUESTIONNAIRE (NOT RESPONDENT): ___________________ 
(B) DATE INTERVIEW CONDUCTED______________________ 
(C)LOCATION INTERVIEW CONDUCTED (CONSULT MAP)     _______________ 
 
1. RATE THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACH TO THE FOLLOWING ATTRIBUTES/ATTRIBUTES:   
 
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT = 5, SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT=4, IMPORTANT=3, INDIFFERENT=2 & 
UNIMPORTANT = 1 
ACTIVITIES/ ATTRIBUTES           
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING  5  4  3  2  1 
BUSH-FOOD RESOURCES   5  4  3  2  1 
HUNTING  5  4  3  2  1 
STOCK FARMING   5  4  3  2  1 
GAME FARMING  5  4  3  2  1 
AGRICULTURE  5  4  3  2  1 
GRASS AND TIMBER AS BUIDING MATERIAL  5  4  3  2  1 
WALKABOUTS INSIDE THE PARK  5  4  3  2  1 
FIREWOOD  5  4  3  2  1 
BIRD WATCHING  5  4  3  2  1 
VIEWING ANIMALS (ACTIVELY)  5  4  3  2  1 




COMMERCIAL  –  ALL  BUSINESS  ACTIVITIES-  USING  PARK  
PROXIMITY 
5  4  3  2  1 
PASSIVE  USE-  VIEWING  CO-INCIDENTLY  OR  ENJOYMENT  NOT 
RELATED TO ACTIVE USE. 
5  4  3  2  1 
IT IS ___ TO ME TO BE RICH. I WANT TO HAVE A LOT OF MONEY 
AND EXPENSIVE THINGS. 
5  4  3  2  1 
BUILDING MY SKILLS IS _____TO MY FUTURE SUCCESS. I LIKE TO 
BE ONE OF THE BEST I CAN. 
5  4  3  2  1 
KNOWING THAT MY FAMILY AND ME ARE SAFE AND AT PEACE IS 
____TO  ME.  I  WOULD  NOT  RISK  MY  HEALTH  FOR  ANY 
OPPORTUNITY 
5  4  3  2  1 
 THE OPINIONS AND VIEWS OF MY ELDERS ARE ______ TO ME. I 
RESPECT  THEM  EVEN  THOUGH  I  DON’T  AGREE  WITH  THEIR 
VIEWS 
5  4  3  2  1 
CULTURAL CEREMONIES AND CUSTOMS ARE ________TO ME. I 
ACCEPT THE IDEAS ABOUT MY LIFE MY CULTURE PROVIDES. 
5  4  3  2  1 
 
2.  RACE  OF  RESPONDENT  (THIS  QUESTION  IS  OPTIONAL,  YOU  DO  NOT  HAVE  TO  ANSWER  THIS 
QUESTION IF YOU FEEL UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT IT)                                                                                                   
RACE   
BLACKS  1 
WHITES  2 
COLOUREDS  3 
INDIANS  4 
OTHER  5 
 
3a). HAVE YOU EVER VISITED THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER PARK □ YES □ NO                                                                   
b) IF NOT WHY HAVE YOU NOT VISITED THE PARK 
CAN NOT AFFORD THE ENTRANCE FEE   
THE PARK IS TOO FAR, I DO NOT HAVE MY OWN TRANSPORT   
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM VISITING THE PARK   




4. WHICH ETHNIC GROUP DO YOU BELONG TO                                                                                     
COMMUNITY NAME   
KHOMANI SAN  1 
MIER  2 
AFRIKANS  3 
TSWANA  4 
OTHER: PLEASE SPECIFY  5………………………………. 
 
5. DATE OF BIRTH ………………………………….. 
 
6. GENDER OF RESPONDENT                                              
 MALE  1 
 FEMALE  2 
 
7. IN WHICH SETTLEMENT OR VILLAGE IS YOUR HOME? _______________ 
 
8. WHAT TYPE OF HOME DO YOU LIVE IN (TICK ALL THAT APPLY)  
SINGLE DWELLING   
UNIT   
SHARED UNIT   
OTHER: PLEASE SPECIFY  ............................................. 
 
9. HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED AT THIS PROPERTY___________ YEARS 
10. DO YOU OWN THE PROPERTY THAT YOU CURRENTLY OCCUPY □ YES □ NO 
11. DO YOU CURRENTLY WORK FOR WAGES? □ YES □ NO  
12. ARE YOU SELF EMPLOYED? □ YES □ NO  
13. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? (PLEASE TICK ALL THAT APPLY)  
STUDENT   
FARMER   
INFORMAL VENDOR   





14. IF YOU PARTICIPATE IN ONE OR MORE COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS, PLEASE SPECIFY THE NAME 
OF THE ORGANISATION, PLEASE LIST 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. IF YOU HAVE A PARTNER AND/OR FELLOW HOUSEHOLD MEMBER IN YOUR HOME, AND PLANS 
WERE MADE TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONSERVATION PROJECT SUCH AS PLANTING OF TREES OR 
MONITORING OF PLANT HARVESTING ACTIVITIES, WHO WOULD DECIDE WHETHER YOUR HOUSEHOLDS 
PARTICIPATES  
YOU   
THEM   
BOTH/ ALL   
 
16. WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATION LEVEL 
EDUCATION LEVEL  TICK  THE 
APPROPRIATE 
SPECIFY THE HIGHEST 
GRADE COMPLETED 
NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL     
PRIMARY SCHOOL      
HIGH SCHOOL      
CERTIFICATE     
DIPLOMA     
DEGREE     
POSTGRADUATE      
ANY OTHER FORMAL TRAINING RECEIVED     
 
17. LAST YEARS HOUSEHOLD INCOME BEFORE TAXES                                                                            
PRE TAX INCOME (RAND)   
0 – 10 000  1 
10 001- 30 000  2 
30 001 –50 000  3 




100 001 – 150 000  5 
150 001 – 200 000  6 
200 001 – 250 000  7 
250 001 – 350 000  8 
350 001 – 500 000  9 
500 001+   10 
 
18. WHAT ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE WHERE YOU CURRENTLY LIVE (IN THE FARM OR YOUR RESIDENCE 
ARE)  
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)   
AGRICULTURE   
GAME FARMING   
HUNTING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING   
FIREWOOD COLLECTION   
OTHER -SPECIFY   
 
19a). DO YOU PERFORM ANY OF THESE ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE COMMUNAL AREA 
BESIDES WHERE YOUR HOUSEHOLD IS CURRENLTY SITUATED (OTHER FARMS BESIDES THE ONE YOU 
CURRENTLY OCCUPY) - IF NOT – SKIP TO QUESTION 20. 
YES  1 
 NO  2 
 
b).  IF  YES,  PLEASE  SPECIFY  THE  ACTIVITIES  THAT  YOU  UNDERTAKE  OR  PERFORM  AT  THE  OTHER 
COMMUNAL AREAS/FARMS 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)   
AGRICULTURE   




HUNTING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING   
FIREWOOD COLLECTION   
OTHER -SPECIFY   
 




20. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT OTHER ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE IN OTHER AREAS/FARMS THAT YOU OR 
ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD DO NOT TAKE PART IN 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)   
AGRICULTURE   
GAME FARMING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING   
HUNTING   
FIREWOOD COLLECTION   
OTHER -SPECIFY   
 
21a). DO YOU PERFORM ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES (MENTIONED IN QESTION 18) ON PUBLIC LAND - IF 
NOT, SKIP TO QUESTION 22. 
YES  1 
 NO  2 
 
b). IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY THE ACTIVITIES THAT YOU UNDERTAKE OR PERFORM ON PUBLIC LAND  
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)   




GAME FARMING   
HUNTING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING   
FIREWOOD COLLECTION   
OTHER -SPECIFY   
 




22. ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT OTHER ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE ON PUBLIC LAND THAT YOU OR ANY 
MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD DO NOT TAKE PART IN 
STOCK FARMING (LIVERSTOCK)   
AGRICULTURE   
GAME FARMING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
BUSH-FOOD HARVESTING   
HUNTING   
FIREWOOD COLLECTION   
OTHER -SPECIFY   
 
23. WHAT ACTIVITIES DO YOU OR ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD PERFORM INSIDE THE PARK (IN 
THE SECTION OF THE PARK WHERE YOUR COMMUNITY HAS BEEN AWARDED THE LAND AND RESOURCE 
RIGHTS) 
HUNTING   
MEDICINAL PLANT HARVESTING   
WALKABOUTS    




OTHER -SPECIFY   
 
24. DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR HOME A PART OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT  
□ YES □ NO 
 
25. DO YOU PARTICIPATE IN ACTIVITIES THAT CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT □ 
YES □ NO 
 
26. WHAT PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN YOUR HOME 
MAINTENANCE   
CLEANING   
NONE   
 
27. DO YOU CONSIDER YOUR COMMUNITY A PART OF THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
□ YES □ NO 
 
28. WHAT PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE COMMUNAL LAND 
REPLANTING   
PLANT HARVESTING MONITORING   
GRAZING MONITORING   
ECOLOGICAL MONITORING   
MONITORING HUNTING   
NONE   
 
29. WHAT PRO- ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE KGALAGADI TRANSFRONTIER 
PARK 
REPLANTING   
SURVEILLANCE   
ECOLOGICAL AND BIRD MONITORING   




30. WHAT PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES DO YOU TAKE PART IN THE PUBLIC LAND 
REPLANTING   
PLANT HARVESTING MONITORING   
GRAZING MONITORING   
ECOLOGICAL MONITORING   
MONITORING HUNTING   
NONE   
 
31. DO YOU THINK YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONSERVING THE ENVIRONMENT ARE 
VERY EFFECTIVE   
SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE   
INDIFFERENT   
NOT EFFECTIVE   
DON’T KNOW   
 
32. ARE YOU REWARDED IN ANY WAY FOR TAKING PART IN THESE ACTIVITIES  
MONETARY COMPENSATION  1 
NON-MONETARY COMPENSATION (SPECIFY)  2 
 VOLUNTER  3 
 
33.  IF  YOU  RECEIVE  MONETARY  COMPENSATION  TO  PERFORM  ACTIVITIES  THAT  CONSERVE  OR 
PROTECT THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IS THIS AMOUNT ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN YOUR LIVELIHOOD  
YES  1 
 NO  2 
AMOUNT RECEIVED IN RANDS  R 
 
34a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR OWN LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY 





b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD   
NO TIME   
DO NOT OWN THE PROPERTY   
OTHER, SPECIFY   
      
 35a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR OWN LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY 
CONSERVATION INITIATIVES ON PUBLIC LAND (IF YES, SKIP TO 36) □ YES □ NO 
 
b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD   
NO TIME   
IT IS NOT A COMMUNITY LAND    
OTHER, SPECIFY   
 
36a). WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY VOLUNTEER YOUR LABOUR TO TAKE PART ON ANY CONSERVATION 
INITIATIVES INSIDE THE PARK (IF YES, SKIP TO 37) □ YES □ NO 
 
b). IF NOT, STATE THE REASON 
TOO OLD   
NO TIME   
DO NOT OWN THE ENTIRE PARK   
OTHER, SPECIFY   
 
37. WOULD YOU COMPROMISE YOUR LIVING SITUATION TO CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT □ YES □ NO 
 
38. WOULD YOU COMPROMISE YOUR WORKING SITUATION TO CONSERVE OR PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT □ YES □ NO 




39. NEGATIVE CHANGES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT CAN COMPROMISE THE WAY I MAKE A 
LIVING 
TRUE  1 
 FALSE  2 
 
40.  ARE YOU AWARE OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN THE KGALAGADI AREA DUE TO OVEREXPLOITATION OR EXCESSIVE HUNTING?                                            
PERSON  IS  WELL  INFORMED  –KNOWS  MORE 
THAN 3 OF THE IMPACTS LISTED BELOW 
1 
PERSON HAS PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE -  KNOWS 1-
3 OF THE IMPACTS LISTED BELOW  
2 
PERSON IS POORLY INFORMED – KNOWS 0 OF  
THE IMPACTS LISTED BELOW 
3 
 
FILL IN THE GAPS IN THE PERSON’S KNOWLEDGE – IMPACTS TO BE READ TO THE RESPONDENT 
 
1.  FOOD INSECURITY 
 
2.  LOSS OF INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES 
 
3.  DISRUPTION OF THE SOCIAL FABRIC 
 
4.  LAND DEGRADATION 
 
5.  LOSS OF UNIQUE HABITATS  
 
6.  CAN COMPROMISE MY HEALTH 
 
7.  NO CHANGE 
 
FOR  QUESTION  41  –  44,  PLEASE  NOTE:  CONSERVATION  OF  BIODIVESITY  GENERALLY  HAS  THE 
FOLLOWING IMPLICATIONS:       
  PROVIDES  THE  BENEFITS  SUCH  AS  a)  RAW  MATERIALS  THAT  DIRECTLY  ENTER  THE 
ECONOMIC PROCESS AS INPUTS. b) OTHER RESOURCES SUCH AS FOOD (WILD FRUITS AND 
MEAT), WHICH ARE DIRECTLY CONSUMED. c) NON-FOOD RESOURCES SUCH AS MEDICINAL 




E)  CULTURAL  DETERMINED  SERVICES  SUCH  AS  THE  FULFILMENT  OF  DEMANDS  FOR 
AESTHETIC SERVICES.  
  PROVIDES COSTS SUCH AS a) MAINTANENCE COSTS SUCH AS WAGES, RUNNING COSTS AND 
MONITORING AND POLICING COSTS. b) COSTS TO OTHER LIVERLIHOOD OPTIONS, SUCH AS 
CONDITIONAL HUNTING c) OPPORTUNITY COSTS IN THE FORM OF ALTERNATIVE LAND. 
 
NB: ALL FUNDING WOULD GO TOWARDS THE INTENDED PROGRAMME AND NOT ADMINISTRATIVE 
FEES. 
 41a). CONSIDERING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CONSERVATION PROJECT THAT ARE APPLICABLE 
TO YOUR HOUSEHOLD, HOW DO YOU THINK THE BENEFITS OF CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY COMPARE 
WITH THE ASSOCIATED COSTS IN A COMMUNAL LAND? 
 
i) BENEFITS > COSTS (GO TO QUESTION b) 
ii) BENEFITS < COSTS (GO TO QUESTION c) 
 
b.) WHAT AMOUNT IN USER FEES PER YEAR ARE YOU WILLING-TO-PAY (WTP), SPECIFICALLY FOR A 
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION PROJECT IN THE COMMUNAL LAND. IF ANSWER IS NOT ZERO, THEN 
SKIP TO 42. 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     
21 – 30  3     
31- 50  4     
51 – 100  5     
101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     
4001 + (SPECIFY)   12     




c).  WHAT  AMOUNT  IN  USER  FEES  PER  YEAR  ARE  YOU  WTP,  SPECIFICALLY  TO  PREVENT  THE 
CONSERVATIVE INITIATIVE PROJECT IN THE COMMUNAL LAND. IF ANSWER IS NOT ZERO, THEN SKIP TO 
42. 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     
21 – 30  3     
31- 50  4     
51 – 100  5     
101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     
4001 + (SPECIFY)   12     
 
d). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER b) OR c) ABOVE IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE 
MORE THAN ONE) 
REASON     
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES  1   
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM THE FARMS/AREA  2   
ABUNDANCE  OF  OTHER  AREA  OPTIONS  –  NO  SCARCITY, 
THEREFORE WHY PAY 
3   
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES   4   
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY  5   





42a). ARE YOU WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO SUPPORT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE INSIDE 
THE PARK AS IN THE COMMUNAL LAND. (IF OPTED FOR PREVENTING THE CONSERVATION PROJECT, 
SKIP TO b) 
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     
21 – 30  3     
31- 50  4     
51 – 100  5     
101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     




b) ARE YOU WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO PREVENT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE INSIDE THE 
PARK AS IN THE COMMUNAL LAND  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     
21 – 30  3     
31- 50  4     




101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     




c). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER a) OR b) IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE MORE 
THAN ONE) 
REASON     
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES  1   
GET  NO  OR  NEGLIGIBLE  VALUE  FROM  THE  KGALAGADI 
TRANSFRONTIER PARK 
2   
ABUNDANCE  OF  OTHER  AREA  OPTIONS  –  NO  SCARCITY, 
THEREFORE WHY PAY 
3   
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES   4   
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY  5   
HAVE NEVER VISITED A PARK, SO WHY PAY     
OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY)  6   
 
d). IF YOU ARE WTP A DIFFERENT AMOUNT FOR EITHER a) OR b) INSIDE THE PARK, WHAT ARE YOUR 
REASONS 
REASON   
FEEL THAT IT IS ALREADY ALLOCATED FUNDS BY THE GOVERNMENT, HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-
PAY LESS 
1 
WILLING-TO-PAY ALREADY FOR THE PROJECT ON THE COMMUNAL LAND, HENCE I AM WILLING-
TO-PAY LESS 
2 




OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY)  4 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
43a). IF YOU ARE WTP FOR A CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON THE COMMUNAL LAND AND INSIDE THE 
PARK, ARE YOU WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO SUPPORT A SIMILAR INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC LAND.  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     
21 – 30  3     
31- 50  4     
51 – 100  5     
101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     
4001 + (SPECIFY)   12   
 
 
   
b). IF YOU ARE WTP TO PREVENT A CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON THE COMMUNAL LAND, ARE YOU 
WTP THE SAME AMOUNT TO PREVENT A SIMILAR CONSERVATION INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC LAND  
AMOUNT WILLING TO PAY (RAND)  PER YEAR       
0  0     
1 – 10  1     
11 - 20  2     




31- 50  4     
51 – 100  5     
101 - 200  6     
201 – 500  7     
501 – 1000  8     
1001 – 2000  9     
2001 – 3000  10     
3001 – 4000  11     
4001 + (SPECIFY)   12     
 
c). IF YOUR ANSWER TO EITHER a) OR b) ABOVE IS ZERO, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS (YOU MAY HAVE 
MORE THAN ONE) 
REASON     
CANNOT AFFORD THE FEES  1   
GET NO OR NEGLIGIBLE VALUE FROM PUBLIC LAND  2   
ABUNDANCE  OF  OTHER  AREA  OPTIONS  –  NO  SCARCITY, 
THEREFORE WHY PAY 
3   
LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN AGENCIES COLLECTING THE USE FEES   4   
PAYING ENOUGH TAXES, FEES ETC ALREADY  5   
OTHER REASONS (SPECIFY)  6   
 
d). IF YOU ARE WTP A DIFFERENT AMOUNT ON PUBLIC LAND, WHAT ARE YOUR REASONS 
REASON   
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY, HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-PAY LESS  1 
WILLING-TO-PAY  MORE  ONLY  WHERE  THE  COMMUNITY  HAS  LAND  AND  RESOURCE  RIGHTS, 
HENCE I AM WILLING-TO-PAY LESS 
2 
I AM CURRENTLY GETTING LESS BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC LAND, HENCE PAY LESS  3 






44. WHO IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSERVING THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
THE GOVERNMENT – WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC LAND   
SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL PARKS (PARKS & PROTECTED AREAS)   
THE COMMUNITY   
DONORS   
ALL STAKEHOLDERS (COMMUNITY, NGO’s, SANPARKS, GOVERNMENT)   
OTHER, SPECIFY   
 
45. WHAT STATEMENT DEFINES BEST YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT IS AT THE SERVICE OF MAN   
MAN  IS  THE  STEWARD/CARE  TAKER  OF  THE  NATURAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
MAN AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ARE INDEPENDENT 
OF EACH OTHER 
 




46. IF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE KGALAGADI AREA WAS TO DEGRADE SUBSTANTIALLY 
 I WOULD STILL LIVE IN THE AREA                                 1             
 I  WOULD  RELOCATE  TO  ANOTHER  AREAS 
INSTEAD 
                               2 
 






                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
43